However, how would a philosophical zombie be able to have a conversation about consciousness, qualia and experience, as we all do, if it were a philosophical zombie? The physical cause of our speech acts about consciousness would still be present sans consciousness, so a philosophical zombie would speak about consciousness. If consciousness is an emergent property, it isn't necessarily true that a philosophical zombie would have consciousness: unless you are a panpsychist, not all combinations of matter will give rise to consciousness.
How philosophical zombie be able to have a conversation about consciousness If consciousness is distinct from matter then, given physical causal closure, consciousness is epiphenomenal and the fact that we are conscious is not the reason we speak about consciousness. If consciousness is an emergent property, it isn't necessarily true that a philosophical zombie would have consciousness That's a pretty confusing way to talk about p-zombies, seeing as p-zombies are defined to be without consciousness. And indeed, besides just consciousness, how could a philosophical zombie discuss any feelings at all, like how it feels to eat or take a nap or feel pain? how could a philosophical zombie discuss any feelings at all, like how it feels to eat or take a nap or feel pain How could it not? It is possible that there is a biologically human entity that can pretend to have conscious experience without having consciousness. And if consciousness were "simply" an emergent property, then wouldn't a philosophical zombie be impossible? One cannot speak of consciousness in all the ways that a conscious person can speak about consciousness without actually being conscious. Let's say you throw a ball at a philosophical zombie and it ducks out of the way. A hardcore solipsist might say that it is possible that everyone else is a philosophical zombie. If the fact that it lacks conscious experience and qualia doesn't prevent it from engaging in other forms of discussion and mimicry I don't see why it would prevent it from discussing consciousness.
How would you go about proving that any of the conversations you've ever had about consciousness weren't with P-Zombies, given that the only consciousness and qualia you can experience are your own? Somehow our physical bodies are able to converse referencing this dimension of consciousness despite the fact that conscious experience itself is not a physical thing. That means being able to talk about anything that a normal conscious human can talk about, including consciousness, qualia and all the rest.
By definition there is no method of detecting the existence or non-existence of qualia in the supposed zombie. Furthermore, nothing prevents them having the same brain states without consciousness, if consciousness is not supervening.
Does this imply or at least hint towards that there is some dualistic interaction between the dimension of consciousness and the physical dimension that the philosophical zombie would exist, solely, in? As a panpsychist, you would be bound to say that philosophical zombies do have consciousness A panpsychist would say that p-zombies do not exist. OK I just answered the other person the same way: You don't deceive people into believing you "experience" this thing called consciousness when you don't. After all, that zombie is the same as me, and I don't have that machinery/brain structure in my own brain. Furthermore, the fact that a P-zombie would still discuss consciousness is pretty much a knockdown argument against the explanatory power of emergentism.
I stay away from saying zombie, and go more with robots, as they're more easily perceived as manipulable. Because feelings refer to consciousness experience, which it doesn't have. It could just be a fancy computer program with no consciousness; AI is getting pretty sophisticated already.
Taught me to almost never talk with others about philosophy If the zombies are physiologically the same as us, but they have no conscious experience, then it means that they don't have some special brain regions designed to "imitate" understanding of feelings and consciousness experience. As a panpsychist, you would be bound to say that philosophical zombies do have consciousness, but you wouldn't have to say that they have a degree of consciousness similar to that of humans. since "philosophical zombie" is a tedious construct, the question is moot. Well a computer program is arguably the best example of a philosophical zombie, and very soon they could be programmed to discuss or debate these types of notions with some complexity. The point is that it is possible that philosophical zombies exist, and that this is grounds for doubting our presumptions.
Of course, since you have no access to other people's consciousness, you can't even get to the induction part. In it, he addresses a variety of concepts for how thinking works, and how minds work, and how consciousness fits into the picture. Well, one of the main traits of a P-Zombie is that it's indistinguishable in every way from conscious beings. If you believe that your neural wiring necessarily causes your consciousness, you don't believe p-zombies can exist. Well, again, you're talking about something that's able to pull off a convincing portrayal of a conscious being, which doesn't require consciousness, merely details that appear conscious. Blind sight patients confabulate correctly what their brains process yet they have no phenomenal consciousness of said stimuli. You wind up with a machine that can carry on a conversation about consciousness, which looks and sounds like a real person, but does not actually possess any knowledge or experience. I would think a way around that would be to assume that the zombies have been programmed to speak in such manner.
I'm not missing the point at all, here is the point of the argument: Let's say you throw a ball at a philosophical zombie and it ducks out of the way. If there is something meaningful missing from the p-zombie, there should be a line of questioning that would reveal this difference. If he's missing the point then explain why his presumptions on what it means to be physiologically equivalent are wrong. Imagine an android, with completely realistic features and strong voice recognition software - like an advanced Cortana or Siri. Read through most of the thread before I got to this comment, I feel like it solves the whole question, why isn't it higher? Maybe machinery is the wrong word, but what I mean is: I currently don't try to deceive people into believing I'm conscious.
AKA, someone physiologically the same as me, but with no consciousness, does not have the neural pathways/structure in place so that it can pretend to reference a conscious experience that it does not have.
As for the idea that consciousness may be an "emergent property". I also disagree with your claim "AI is getting pretty sophisticated already" if you mean it is getting anywhere near human intelligence. If I did that, it would mean I have the specific neural connections so that when conversations take place, I do processing that involves deception.
I have to admit I can't quite wrap my head around it which is why I'm posting here. that still doesn't mean that consciousness is a physical thing. Basically, zombies physiologically the same as humans would not have specialized brain machinery for fooling other people into believing that they are conscious. furthermore, i'm not sure whether your dualism above is your own, or made for purposes of the thought experiment alone? As the most common arguments for mental supervenience are not inductive, then neither is the argument against p-zombies. We don't know if the brain states we associate with the conscious intent of deception must necessarily come together: we have not observed consciousness outside our own. Nowhere in that strain of events does consciousness need to come into the question. And the statements don't fit into a 2 paragraph post, no matter how well you refine them.
We might imagine a universe with the same physical laws but different emergence laws, such that nothing emerges from the physical. Also, it's not true at all what you say elsewhere that the arguments against p-zombies are inductive. Finally, I'm not sure why you bring up falsifiability since, again, p-zombies are defined to be unfalsifiable.