Reece Nathan Russo

The Great Russo, Sorcerer Supreem

Understanding the Philosophical Zombie Argument


It basically says since it's conceivable that physical states don't cause mental states,physical states actually don't cause mental states. The conclusion of the argument is not that physicalism is false because natural laws don't cause mental events. The difficulty for the physicalist is that it seems that we just don't have any understanding of physical processes like this.


Oh. So it can be simulataneously be true thawt our consciousness is caused by neurochemical process but physicalism is false? So it can be simulataneously be true thawt our consciousness is caused by neurochemical process but physicalism is false? The zombie argument is very controversial, and many think the conceivability bit is the most suspect part. The P-Zombie is just an illustration for the real argument that consciousness can't be given a reductive explanation. The defender of the argument may at this point challenge you to explain your knowledge of metaphysical modality, if it's not based on conceivability. I would imagine any serious functionality would draw a strict distinction between functional states entailing consciousness and non-conscious states. I don't think you've said enough here to identify any particular position on the mind-body problem here. The zombie argument is too recent to be considered settled by any degree. I happen to agree, but it's important to get clear on what the argument is saying before you show why it's wrong.


The interesting thing about the zombie argument is that there are actual instances in reality that shows us perception is separate from the experience of perception. surely a physicalist would just deny qualia can be removed without changing physical properties, I guess there are two replies here. The key here, I think, is that the computation seems to be the same thing as the electrical signals. But certainly there are some plausible readings of what you mean by "consciousness is caused by neurochemical process" that are consistent with physicalism being false. I believe that me being conscious right now is the consequence of the way matter energy are arranged in my head. Until someone with blindsight can read a book, or navigate based on a map, this condition provides no philosophical insight into qualia.

Indeed, and are the only premises and every step in the argument is valid. Well, you could have an awful lot of significant but unstated baggage implied by whatever exactly you mean by "caused by". If the progress of science had furnished us with such an understanding, that would be a compelling grounds for hanging our a posteriori physicalism on. and, notably, comparable of type and complexity to those which are attended by conscious states This is only superficially true. The argument seems fishy to me. This is presumably the hang-up: it's a rather astounding claim at present, and deferring to our ideal science runs afoul of Hempel's dilemma. its output does not feed back as input such that this recurrence is critical to its function. Another criteria might be the complexity of the neural network needed to accurately recognize emotions compared to consciousness at full capacity. Also, please consider using Voat. co as an alternative to Reddit as Voat does not censor political content.


It's certainly not the case that any neural functional state entails consciousness, but that's easy to show without blindsight. Also, entire encyclopedia entries have been written about zombies, so you may want to consult that. Just to add: When I say that 'conceivability doesn't imply possibility' is the most common objection to the argument, I'm basing that on the survey results. One problem with your parody is that you're talking about physical possibility, whereas zombies are normally only alleged to be metaphysically or 'broadly logically' possible. The way I understood it is the Kripke and Putnam are arguing that the intension doesn't determine the extension of an intentional state. The weird thing is they just feel like they are guessing, but they know without knowing they know.


In any case, I don't see how we're getting from here to the thesis that a phenomenon like blindsight gives us no insight into qualia. Many will agree that mental events depend on physical stuff governed by natural laws. I agree with all the points you made, but I do think there is a clear candidate for such a categorical distinction: recurrence. Could it be argued that physicalism is a posteriori neccessary? And it's conceivable that pain could just as well be caused by 'd-tubes flushing' as well as 'c-fibers firing. ' Moreover, recurrent networks are categorically distinct from tree based networks : recurrent networks can model state whereas non-recurrent networks cannot.


The type and complexity of these cases is not at all comparable to the many functions capable of being carried out by consciousness. One is that I'm not sure I can really conceive of a computer that's physically just like a computer but isn't computing anything. Here's a better version: IMO it sounds like 'imagine a universe where the natural laws,spacetime etc. The answer which often occurs to people at this point is that it contradicts the thesis of physicalism, but this doesn't seem very compelling, since it amounts to a circular argument. This point is justified by the fact that we can construct non-recurrent neural nets that can recognize emotion. And if we can find a good functionalist or identity-theoretic distinction to appeal to here, the point remains. I'm not a neurologist, so I am not sure I got all the details right.


Now if physicalism is the view that zombies are impossible in principle, and we can conceive zombies, then physicalism is false, because the conceivability of zombies shows that they're possible. It is an old view in metaphysics that whatever is conceivable is possible, so if zombies are conceivable, then zombies are possible.


Kripke was raising a problem for identity theory specifically , and Chalmers is tackling monism wholesale with the intent of supporting property dualism. Presumably the brain processes involved in various examples of blind sight are not necessarily recurrent, i. e. I myself of course have little sympathy for either of these tactics. The difficulty is that it seems we don't have such an understanding. The set of possible outputs for an emotion recognition system is constrained to a low number.

are the same but stars don't form,therefore naturall laws aren't responsible for stars. ' The thing about blindseers is that they usually had sight before, which is why they are able to report not thinking they can see.


That's enough, since identity is thought to be metaphysically necessary, not merely physically. I didn't mean to suggest that Kripke was or does support any sort of dualism, but I do think his causal theory of reference is sympathetic to the concepts put forth in the 'zombie' argument. ' It sounds as if you're questioning the connection between conceivability and possibility; you're questioning.


One the other hand, brain processes involved with consciousness are necessarily recurrent. One such criteria might be the length of the possible sequence of outputs of the process.

I do.